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Human security and the rise of the social
PATRICIA OWENS*
Abstract. As the concept of human security has become part of the mainstream discourse
of international politics it should be no surprise that both realist and critical approaches to
international theory have found the agenda wanting. This article seeks to go beyond both
the realist and biopolitical critiques by situating all three – political realism, biopolitics and
human security – within the history and theory of the modern rise of the social realm from
late eighteenth and nineteenth century Europe. Human security is the further expansion of
social forms of governance under capitalism, more specifically a form of socialpolitik than
realpolitik or biopolitics. Drawing on the work of historical sociologist Robert Castel and
political theorist Hannah Arendt, the article develops an alternative framework with which
to question the extent to which ‘life’ has become the subject of global intervention through
the human security agenda.
Patricia Owens is Reader in the Department of International Relations, University of Sussex
and Senior Research Associate at the Oxford-Leverhulme Programme on the Changing
Character of War. She is author of Between War and Politics: International Relations and
the Thought of Hannah Arendt (Oxford, 2007). Previous articles have appeared in European
Journal of International Relations, Review of International Studies, International Aﬀairs,
International Relations, Millennium, Third World Quarterly, Alternatives, and International
Politics.
The concept that has done most to organise thinking and international action
around the management of poverty and armed conflict in the post-Cold War
period is human security, usually defined as the protection and empowerment of
people caught up in extreme violence and underdevelopment.1 So conceived,
security and development are mutually reinforcing. Security can be extended
through tending to material needs and vice versa. Based on a contrast between the
old geopolitical security agenda of states and a new agenda concerned with
individuals and of populations, International Studies usually presents human
security in terms of a new politics of fostering life rather than focussing on
sovereign states and their control over the means of death. Where national security
* An earlier version of this article was presented at the Department of Political Science at the
University of California, Los Angeles. For their very helpful comments, I am especially grateful to
Joshua Dienstag, Bille Eltringham, Kirstie McClure, Beltrán Undarraga, and the four anonymous
reviewers.
1 Caroline Thomas, Global Governance, Development and Human Security: The Challenge of Poverty
and Inequality (London: Pluto Press, 2000); Commission on Human Security, Human Security Now:
Protecting and Empowering People (New York: UN, 2003); Sandra Jean MacLean, David Ross Black
and Timothy M. Shaw (eds), A Decade of Human Security: Global Governance and New
Multilateralisms (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006); Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh and Anuradha M. Chenoy,
Human Security: Concepts and Implications (London: Routledge, 2007).
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is about the defence of the sovereign state from violent attack, human security is
intended to protect and defend individuals and groups from all forms of violence.
It is about securing the lives of individuals as ends in themselves, not as means to
the ends of states. This seemingly new agenda requires the participation of a much
broader range of actors than national governments. It often bypasses the state to
work with populations through a range of economic, health, and educational
interventions. Not only states, but international institutions, non-governmental
organisations (NGOs) and civil society are all empowered to intervene on behalf
of the worldwide society of humankind.
For many advocates of this new agenda, human security is a progressive
transformation away from the Cold War (and ‘War on Terror’) obsession with
military issues towards UN Development Programme (UNDP) concepts of
economic security, the security of food, health, the environment, the person,
communities, and even politics itself.2 In defining human security so broadly – the
protection of ‘the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human
freedoms and fulfilment’ – the UN has put itself in the position to act on behalf
of a wide range of needs. The UN Trust Fund for Human Security administers
almost two hundred projects around the world that ‘promote multi-sectoral,
multi-organization and sustainable solutions to the most under-funded and
intractable challenges’.3 An extensive bureaucracy of global health and welfare,
food and housing, security, and policing has been established for the transnational
administration and merging of ‘security’ and ‘development’. The human security
bureaucracy is a measure of how far the concept has penetrated the architecture of
global governance. In addition to the work of the UN, an extensive network of
government agencies, international financial and political organisations, academics
and university centres, international commissions, non-profit NGOs, ‘civil society’
groups, and private and semi-private companies are all dedicated to working out,
funding, and implementing the human security agenda.4 On the ground, at the
operational level, this network translates into a global division of labour designed
to implement human security policy.
Human security has been described as ‘the dominant framework of inter-
national regulation’, and yet, as David Chandler argues, the dramatic change in the
discourse of international intervention has occurred ‘without radical changes at the
level of . . . power relations’.5 The dominant states and their international
organisations appear to be quite comfortable in promoting the ‘human’ as the
2 UN Human Development Reports {http://hdr.undp.org/en/} accessed 4 June 2011; Mary Kaldor,
Human Security (Cambridge: Polity, 2007); Mary Martin and Mary Kaldor (eds), The EU and
Human Security External Interventions and Missions (London: Routledge, 2009).
3 Comments made at ‘Sixth Meeting of the Friends of Human Security’ (4 June 2009), {http://
ochaonline.un.org/SixthMeetingoftheFriendsofHumanSecurity/tabid/5709/language/en-US/Default.
aspx} accessed 4 June 2011; The UN Trust Fund for Human Security was established in 1999 and the
UN Oﬃce for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aﬀairs created the Human Security Unit in 2004 which
manages the Trust Fund, integrates UN human security activities and translates the concept into
concrete activities on the ground. Since 1999, the Fund has committed over $340 million to projects in
over seventy countries, mainly in Africa, Asia-Pacific and Eastern and Central Asia. {http://ochaonline.
un.org/Home/tabid/2097/Default.aspx} accessed 4 June 2011.
4 Neil S. MacFarlane and Yuen Foong Khong, Human Security and the UN: a Critical History
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006).
5 David Chandler, ‘Human Security II: Waiting for the Tail To Wag the Dog: A Rejoinder to
Ambrosetti, Owen and Wibben’, Security Dialogue, 39 (2008) pp. 465–6.
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referent object of security. What explains this apparent paradox, the distinction
between the celebratory tone and grand claims surrounding the new framework
and the political and economic hierarchies within which human security occurs? To
date, the two most compelling explanations would seem to be provided by political
realism, which emphasises continuing geopolitical power relations, and followers of
Michel Foucault, who point to biopolitical forms of control.6 For political realists,
the human security agenda is ultimately compatible with the exercise of hegemonic
state power and realpolitik.7 It is no surprise that the human security agenda has
authorised intervention and reconstruction based on a sliding scale not of need but
of threats to the interests of powerful states in the West and the dominant classes
in both the North and South. After all, one goal of human security is to
reconstruct eﬀective and responsible states capable of providing security them-
selves. Seen this way, such interventions reinforce rather than challenge the existing
distribution of power and policy discourse in international politics. For those
drawing on Foucault, human security should also not be understood as a benign
humanitarian framework for the protection of the world’s most vulnerable; it is
about the ‘socialisation’ and disciplining of states in the global South.8 From the
eighteenth century, Foucault claimed, a new form of ‘biopower’ emerged in Europe
that could work on and through populations. Biological ‘life itself’ became subject
to a variety of interventions aimed at improving, but also controlling and
normalising, certain forms of life. On this view, the distinct means of biopolitical
governance is ‘man-as-species’, a form of power central to human security.
As the concept of human security has become part of the mainstream discourse
of international politics it should be no surprise that both realist and critical
approaches to development and security have found the agenda wanting. This
6 Michel Foucault, Society Must be Defended: Lectures at the Collège de France 1975–1976, trans.
David Macey, ed. Mauro Bertani and Alessandro Fontana (New York: Picador, 2003); Security,
Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1977–1978, trans. Graham Burchell, ed.
Michel Senellart (London: Palgrave, 2007); The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de
France, 1978–1979, trans. Graham Burchell, ed. Michel Senellart (London: Palgrave, 2008).
7 Stephen D. Krasner, ‘Sharing Sovereignty: New Institutions for Collapsed and Failing States’,
International Security, 29 (2004), pp. 85–120; James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, ‘Neotrusteeship
and the Problem of Weak States’, International Security, 28 (2004), pp. 5–43.
8 Stefan Elbe, ‘AIDS, Security, Biopolitics’, International Relations, 19 (2005) pp. 403–19; Mark
Duﬃeld and Nicholas Waddell, ‘Securing Humans in a Dangerous World’, International Politics, 43
(2006), pp. 1–23; Mark Duﬃeld, Development, Security and Unending War: Governing the World of
Peoples (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007); Jacqueline Berman, ‘The “Vital Core”: From Bare Life to
the Biopolitics of Human Security’, in Giorgio Shani, Makoto Sato and Mustapha Kamal Pasha
(eds), Protecting Human Security in a Post 9/11 World: Critical and Global Insights (London:
Palgrave, 2007), pp. 30–49; Kyle Grayson, ‘Human Security as Power/Knowledge: the Biopolitics of
a Definitional Debate’, Cambridge Review of International Aﬀairs, 21 (2008), pp. 383–401; Miguel De
Larrinaga and Marc G. Doucet, ‘Sovereign Power and the Biopolitics of Human Security’, Security
Dialogue, 39 (2008), pp. 517–37; Kosuke Shimizu, ‘Human Security, Governmentality, and
Sovereignty: a Critical Examination of Contemporary Discourses on Universalizing Humanity’, in
François Debrix and Mark Lacy (eds), The Geopolitics of American Insecurity: Terror, Power and
Foreign Policy (London: Routledge, 2008), pp. 143–60; David Roberts, Global Governance and
Biopolitics: Regulating Human Security (London, Zed Books, 2010); Marc G. Doucet and Miguel de
Larrinaga, ‘Human Security and the Securing of Human Life: Tracing Global Sovereign and
Biopolitical Rule’, in David Chandler and Niklas Hynek (eds), Critical Perspectives on Human
Security: Rethinking Emancipation and Power in International Relations (London: Routledge, 2010),
pp. 129–43; Suvi Alt, ‘Problematizing Life under Biopower: a Foucauldian versus an Agambenite
critique of Human Security’, in Chandler and Hynek (eds), Critical Perspectives on Human Security,
pp. 144–56; also see Hans-Martin Jaeger, ‘UN Reform, Biopolitics, and Global Governmentality’,
International Theory, 2 (2010), pp. 50–86.
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article seeks to go further than the realist and biopolitical critiques by situating all
three – political realism, biopolitics, and human security – within the history and
theory of the modern rise of the social realm from late eighteenth and nineteenth
century Europe. Human security is the further expansion of social forms of
governance under capitalism, more specifically a form of socialpolitik than
realpolitik or biopolitics. The claim is not that concepts drawn from realism or
biopolitics are totally inadequate to the task of analysing human security. Both
capture crucial elements of social regulation, namely the interests dominant states
have in promoting human security and the increasing levels of intervention into the
biological life of populations.9 As political realist Max Weber observed, ‘in spite of
all “social welfare policies”, the whole course of the [modern] state’s inner political
functions, of justice and administration, is repeatedly and unavoidably regulated by
the objective pragmatism of “reasons of state”’.10 On the other hand, human
security as a field of knowledge and practice could easily appear to be fertile
ground for those looking for the latest manifestations of biopolitical power over
life that operates on a global scale. Rather, the argument is that political realist
and biopolitical power are less the essence of contemporary relations of domination
than two elements of something broader and more fundamental: the modern rise
of the social realm as an arena for the management of collective needs under
capitalism.
The idea of a separate and identifiable social realm, distinct from politics and
economy, polis and oikos, is a relatively new development in the history of political
thought dating only to the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries in Europe.
Rather than a timeless and universally applicable concept, the definition and
meaning of ‘the social’ can only be understood in the context of a specific historical
constellation, which developed after – not automatically with – the rise of
territorial states in modern Europe.11 At the broadest level, the rise of a social
realm within and eventually across distinct ‘societies’ was a product of the
capitalist and democratic revolutions and associated large-scale and geographically
variable processes of working class radicalisation, bureaucratisation, and imperi-
alism. The rise and study of the social were first oriented around the problem of
managing the new ‘mass society’ in increasingly diﬀerentiated capitalist nation-
states. The first ‘social’ theories, the beginning of social explanations for political
and economic developments, emerged in response to a question, the ‘Social
Question’: could the welfare of the radicalised working classes be managed such
that the capitalist system of wage labour was not overthrown?12 The dominant
9 Hence the argument here departs from David Chandler’s criticisms of biopolitical theory, which he
argues is a parody of the liberal cosmopolitanism that it aims to undermine. See Chandler,
‘Critiquing Liberal Cosmopolitanism? The Limits of the Biopolitical Approach’, International
Political Sociology, 3 (2009), pp. 53–70.
10 Max Weber, ‘Religious Rejections of the World and their Directions’, From Max Weber: Essays in
Sociology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1946), p. 334.
11 This approach contrasts with much of the recent ‘social turn’ in international studies, which adopts
‘the social’ as a form of explanation and particular ontology while marginalising the historical
origins of the very concept. See, for example, Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International
Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
12 J. A. Hobson, The Social Problem: Life and Work (James Nisbet & Co.: London: 1901); Andrew
Robert Aisenberg, Contagion: Disease, Government, and the ‘Social Question’ in Nineteenth Century
France (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999); Patrick Joyce (ed.), The Social in Question:
New Bearings in History and the Social Sciences (London: Routledge, 2002).
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political ideologies of the nineteenth century – liberal, conservative and socialist –
all agreed on the existence of the social; they disagreed on the justification and
method of intervention into it. Political realism, which could appear in a liberal or
a more conservative and authoritarian guise, was deeply shaped by the Social
Question and its identification of the potential threat to state power from organised
workers.13 One method of social governance – how class conflict became
subordinated to state power – was targeted interventions into the basic life
conditions of populations, a development pioneered by well-known practitioners of
realpolitik, Otto von Bismarck and Max Weber, and later powerfully described by
Foucault.14
A variety of historians and theorists have pointed to the historical specificity of
the social, its rise within late eighteenth and nineteenth century Europe and its
consequences for economy and politics. They include Karl Polanyi’s analysis of
political economy and the ‘discovery society’; Gunnar Myrdal’s writing on ‘social
housekeeping’; Hannah Arendt’s account of the life process acquiring its own
public domain; Jürgen Habermas’s writing on the political function of the public
sphere in bourgeois ‘society’; Jacques Donzelot’s account of the ‘invention of
society’; the later Foucault’s account of the image of society as a self-contained
unity with its own laws, mechanisms and liberal governance techniques; Robert
Castel’s study of the emergence and various transformations of the Social Question
since the Middle Ages; and George Steinmetz’s study of diﬀerent paradigms of
social regulation.15 Drawing on each of these thinkers where appropriate, this
article will nonetheless oﬀer a focused analysis of two that have analysed ‘the
social’ in diﬀerent but complementary ways, an historical sociologist and a political
theorist. Specifically, Robert Castel’s work on the Social Question and Hannah
Arendt’s account of the modern rise of the social oﬀer a persuasive theoretical
ground from which to question the extent to which ‘life’ has become the subject
of global intervention through the human security agenda.16 It is possible to
reconstruct and defend an historical and theoretical analysis of the social, an
account that overlaps with but is irreducible to the one suggested by Foucault and
which oﬀers an entirely diﬀerent evaluation of politics to the political realism of
Weber.
13 For an excellent discussion of how political realism dealt with the Social Question in the German
context see George Steinmetz, Regulating the Social: the Welfare State and Local Politics in Imperial
Germany (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), pp. 19–24.
14 Marcel van Meerhaeghe, ‘Bismarck and the Social Question’, Journal of Economic Studies, 33 (2006),
pp. 284–301.
15 Gunnar Myrdal, The Political Element in the Development of Economic Theory, trans. Paul Streeten
(London: Routledge, 1953); Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic
Origins of Our Time (Boston: Beacon Press, [1957], 2001); Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition
(Chicago: Chicago University of Press, 1958); Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of
the Public Sphere: an Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,
[1962] 1991); Jacques Donzelot, L’Invention du Social: Essai sur le Déclin des Passions Politiques
(Paris: Librairie Arthème, 1984); Foucault, ‘Society Must Be Defended’; Robert Castel, From Manual
Workers to Wage Laborers: Transformation of the Social Question, trans. and ed. Robert Boyd (New
Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 2003); Steinmetz, Regulating the Social.
16 There is a small, but growing, literature on Arendt in international political theory. See Anthony
Lang Jr. and John Williams (eds), Hannah Arendt and International Relations: Readings across the
Lines (London: Palgrave, 2005); Patricia Owens, Between War and Politics: International Relations
and the Thought of Hannah Arendt (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); Patrick Hayden,
Political Evil in a Global Age: Hannah Arendt and International Theory (London: Routledge, 2009).
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The article proceeds in three moves. The first section oﬀers some preliminary
distinctions between primary sociability and specific forms of ‘social’ institutions,
drawn by Castel, and between these institutions that centre on managing ‘life’ and
the political ‘world’, drawn from Arendt. This is necessary not only for the history
of the modern social realm but to distinguish the argument about the merging of
biological and political life (that Arendt identified twenty years before Foucault)
from political realism and biopolitical theory. The second section oﬀers an account
of the social realm as a distinct historical formation and its specific ontology as a
scaled-up form of public housekeeping. Managing the ‘life process of society’, and
placing the life process at the centre of governance, is described as an exercise of
power that works through the merging of activities associated with polis and oikos,
‘public’ realm and ‘private’ household. The third part illustrates the usefulness of
the historical and ontological account of the social through a conceptualisation of
human security as securing and developing the ‘life process of society’ on an
increasingly global scale; how human security is ‘socially’ administered; and how
the subjects of human security are constituted in a manner appropriate to social
behaviour rather than political action.
The social and the political, life and world
The concepts of ‘social’ and ‘society’ – like the related terms ‘societal’ and
‘sociability’ – can mean several things depending on political and historical context.
The Latin term societas referred to a loose federation of allies for a specific purpose
and later to particular fellowships and partnerships of various sorts (such as ‘High
Society’ in the eighteenth century). There are many forms of human collective and
not all of them are ‘social’ in the sense developed here. Humans are obviously
dependent on others and ‘provisions must be made’, as Arendt put it, ‘that aﬀect
the existence of all, since without such provisions, communal life would be
impossible’.17 Robert Castel has usefully described this element of communal life
as ‘societal’ and is the elementary relationship of dependency that can be
understood in terms of human primary sociability.18 At the most basic and general
level, collective existence can be referred to as ‘societal’ and is chiefly concerned
with tending to the basic needs of life. Primary sociability is the dominant form of
interaction in feudal communities, which tend to be defined by patrimonial
relations of obligation and protection, blood bonds, strict hierarchies of gender and
sexuality, and, in Castel’s words, seemingly ‘permanent relationships of dependence
and interdependence rooted in bounded territorial communities’.19 Such historically
and geographically variable arrangements can be characterised as ‘societies without
the social’.
Human collectivities become ‘social’ when primary sociability breaks down and
‘public order’ – as defined by dominant political and economic groups – is
17 Arendt, Promise of Politics (New York, Schocken, 2005), p. 115.
18 ‘The first historical act’, according to Marx and Engels, ‘is thus the production of the means to
satisfy these needs [food, water, shelter], the production of material life itself’. Karl Marx and
Friedrich Engels, The German Ideology (New York: International Publishers, 1970), p. 48.
19 Castel, From Manual Workers to Wage Laborers, p. 11.
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disturbed. More specifically, social institutions are those specialised bodies –
hospitals, orphanages, homeless shelters, refugee camps – which arise in more
complex human collectivities when the primary bonds of sociability are inadequate
to the task of attending to basic needs to an extent which threatens existing
economic and governance hierarchies. Castel has suggested five formal character-
istics that can be found in all social institutions: 1) ‘a collective construct of
practices whose function is protective, integrative, and only later, preventative . . .
societal assistance arises from the intervention of society upon itself’; 2) ‘some
degree of specialisation and later professionalisation in the provision of social
assistance’; 3) ‘a level of routinisation in the determination of when “social”
interventions are required, which groups should receive it and which should not’;
4) ‘delivery of social assistance is always implicated in the creation of new forms
of space, of territorialisation and localisation, of treatment in a specialized
institutional site’; and 5) ‘the criteria for receipt of assistance depends on
communal belonging’.20 Later we will describe and analyse some of the formal
characteristics of these institutions that are evident in the administration of human
security. The point to note here is that we can describe these institutions as ‘public’
in that they reflect matters of common concern. However, strictly speaking, they
should not be understood as ‘political’.
The social and the political are not synonymous concepts. Confusion over the
diﬀerence, according to Arendt, can be traced, in part, to a misreading of
Aristotle’s famous definition of the essence of humans as zo¯on politikon, as a
political animal. As early as Catholic theologian Thomas Aquinas this became
‘homo est naturaliter politicus, id est, socialis (“man is by nature political, that is,
social”)’.21 ‘“Social animal”’, sociologist Raymond Aron similarly asserted, ‘is as
good a definition of zoon politicon as “political animal”’.22 Yet Aristotle’s
‘politikon’, Arendt insisted, did not mean any form of human collectivity. It
referred only to the organisation of the polis, ‘a unique, outstanding way of life,
of being-together’.23 If what is particular to humans is that we are social beings
then surely we would not have needed Aristotle to realise the ‘banality’.24 As Castel
has put it, ‘the social should not be understood . . . as the collection of relationships
that distinguish humanity as the species’.25 Yet one consequence of the claim that
homo est naturaliter politicus, id est, socialis is that in modern sociology and even
much ‘political philosophy’, argued Arendt, ‘politics does not even have an origin
of its own: it came into being because of the elementary and prepolitical fact of
biological necessity, which makes men need each other in the arduous task of
keeping alive’.26 Up to and including the contemporary period, the management
of communal life is imagined to be the end purpose of ‘politics’, now conceived as
a form of governmental administration. Its purpose is to manage the basic needs
and processes necessary to sustain human life. Such assumptions about politics –
20 Ibid., pp. 16–17.
21 Arendt, Human Condition, p. 23.
22 Raymond Aron, Progress and Disillusion: the Dialectics of Modern Society (Middlesex: Penguin,
1968), p. 8.
23 Hannah Arendt, ‘Karl Marx and the Tradition of Western Political Thought’, Social Research, 69
(2002), p. 295.
24 Arendt, ‘Karl Marx and the Tradition’, p. 295.
25 Castel, From Manual Workers to Wage Laborers, p. 10.
26 Arendt, Promise of Politics, p. 83.
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that it is to ‘secure life, livelihood, and a minimum of happiness for the many’ –
make it plausible to assume that politics exists everywhere and every form of
human interaction is political.27
To better distinguish the social from the political it is necessary to briefly review
the philosophical-anthropological character of primary sociability, the require-
ments of human ‘life itself’. Arendt’s approach is famously built on her analysis of
three forms of human activity: labour, work, and action. The closest activity to the
primary sociability described by Castel is the elemental character of labour and
labouring activities. Arendt defined labour as ‘the activity which corresponds to the
biological process of the human body, whose spontaneous growth, metabolism,
and eventual decay are bound to the vital necessities produced and fed into the life
process by labor. The human condition of labor is life itself’.28 We engage in
labouring activities, humans as animal laborans, to sustain natural, biological life
on earth, an activity we have in common with all animals. Animal laborans is not
the labouring class itself, or any ‘sociologically’ defined group. Rather it is a ‘way
of life, even of a relationship to the world’.29 Human labour links us most closely
to nature and the earth we inhabit with other living creatures. We confront the
physical realities imposed on us independently of our will, through our subjective
needs and wants, though the conditions under which humans labour are always
shaped by human conventions.
In contrast to the life sustaining activity of labour, work is the human eﬀort to
create, to fabricate and make an artificial and objective world of durable objects
and things. This ‘world’ is diﬀerent from the natural environment of the earth, the
lived place shared by all biological creatures. ‘the human condition of work’,
Arendt suggested, ‘is worldliness’.30 To engage in work, humans as homo faber, is
to rebel against the dictates of nature, perhaps even to the point of destroying it.
Work is constituted by a world of objects and things governed by the categories
of means and ends; the ends justify the means. Fabrication, reification, and
instrumentalism are the modes and methods of homo faber. ‘If nature and the earth
generally constitute the condition of human life’, Arendt maintained, ‘then the
world and the things of the world constitute the condition under which this
specifically human life can be at home on earth’.31 From art and architecture to
laws and public monuments, it is through work that humans create the artefacts
that make the world our home.
Arendt’s third and distinctively political activity is action. This is the human
capacity for initiative and spontaneity, the ability to begin something new that
cannot have been predicted. It can never be captured by a plan or blueprint found
in the making activities of work. The ontological bases of political action are two
facts: natality and plurality. The former is the biological fact of birth, which means
that the essence of humans is that we are beginners. Through action and speech,
humans have the capacity to begin and create new worlds and thereby interrupt
and disrupt the endless processes associated with labour and the instrumentality
27 Ibid., p. 115.
28 Arendt, Human Condition, p. 7.
29 Martin Levin, ‘Animal Laborans and Homo Politicus, in Hannah Arendt: a Note’, Political Theory,
7 (1979), p. 523.
30 Arendt, Human Condition, p. 7.
31 Ibid., p. 134, emphasis in original.
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associated with work. Metaphorically and literally, childbirth and childrearing
connect labour to the public, political world; it is how the human body is
‘transcended into a common world’.32 This is human life in its ‘non-biological
sense, the span of each time man has between birth and death’. This form of life,
Arendt wrote, ‘manifests itself in action and speech’.33 Plurality refers to the fact
that there are many of us, but in a manner more than the simple multiplication of
the human species; ‘nobody is ever the same as anyone else who lived, lives, or will
ever live’. This ‘plurality’, she argued, ‘is specifically the condition . . . of all
political life’ and is expressed in the human capacity to join together with others
to create a public political world.34 In common with the activity of ‘work’, political
action is constitutive of a public realm; it is a worldly and world-making activity.
Pause to note how this conception of political action is fundamentally at odds
with the theory of political realism. While Arendt agreed with Max Weber, Carl
Schmitt and Hans Morgenthau that political conflict and the political realm could
not be reduced to a scientific problem with a technical solution, that the political
was distinct from other forms of human endeavour, she possessed an entirely
diﬀerent evaluation of the meanings of politics, power, and violence.35 As Margaret
Canovan has put it, Arendt ‘defied the German tradition of “realism” by
maintaining that it is action-as-speech rather than government that constitutes true
politics; that agreement and consent, not domination, found republics, and that
acting in concert, not violence, creates power.’36 It is also important to note here
that political action discloses a unique form of political subjectivity that Arendt
described in terms of ‘who’ rather than ‘what’ we are. It is an account of political
subjectivity wholly absent from the realist tradition but which illuminates
something fundamental to social regulation as distinct from political action, a
contrast we return to in the analysis of human security.
‘Who’ we are and ‘what’ we are is not the same. ‘What-ness’, Arendt argued,
is an attribute of physical fact and identity that may connect a person to and define
them against others, such as gender, race or sexuality. Once the identity construct
has been adopted or imposed, this ‘what-ness’ becomes the quality that describes
a certain type; it identifies diﬀerent specimens ‘of the animal species man-kind’,
such as the constructions of ‘women’, ‘men’ and ‘children’ or diﬀerent ethnic and
32 Arendt, ‘Karl Marx and the Tradition’, p. 285; Arendt, Essays in Understanding, 1930–1954 (New
York: Harcourt Brace, 1994), p. 321.
33 Arendt, Human Condition, p. 173.
34 Ibid., pp. 7, 8, emphasis in original. As Arendt put it, the ‘term “public” literally signifies the world
itself, insofar as it is common to all of us and distinguished from our privately owned place in it.
This world . . . is not identical to the earth or with nature . . . It is related, rather, to the human
artifact, the fabrication of human hands, as well as to aﬀairs that go on among those who inhabit
the man-made world together . . . the world, like every in-between, relates and separates men at the
same time’. Arendt, Human Condition, p. 52.
35 See Weber, ‘Science as a Vocation’, From Max Weber, pp. 129–56; Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the
Political (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996 [1932]); Hans J. Morgenthau, Scientific Man
vs. Power Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1946). As Peter Baehr has written, ‘few authors
of the twentieth-century oﬀered a more comprehensive alternative to Weber’s political and
sociological thought than Arendt did.’ See Baehr, ‘The Grammar of Prudence: Arendt, Jaspers, and
the Appraisal of Max Weber’, in Steven E. Ashheim (ed.), Hannah Arendt in Jerusalem (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 2001), pp. 307, 323.
36 Margaret Canovan, Hannah Arendt: A Reinterpretation of Her Political Thought (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 185.
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racial groupings.37 Someone’s ‘who-ness’, in contrast, is their specific, unique, and
distinguishing identity that is constantly recreated and revealed in political action
and speech. As Arendt insisted, ‘only man can . . . distinguish himself, and only he
can communicate himself and not merely something – thirst or hunger, aﬀection or
hostility or fear’.38 This is action and speech among individuals that are not the
same but equal.39 Who somebody is, Arendt wrote, is ‘implicit in everything
somebody says and does’.40 This agent is disclosed to others through words and
deeds in the common public realm that is itself constituted by such action and
speech. This distinctly human ability to initiate new beginnings and found new
political spaces is, in practice, an historical and cultural construction. It is within
the capacity of all humans to found and sustain a political world, but only under
certain conditions.
The distinction between labour, work, and action is also a distinction between
‘life itself’ and the possibility of constituting a public, political ‘world’. Since
Aristotle’s The Politics, various traditions of political thought and practice have
struggled over the meaning of the diﬀerence between life and world. The distinction
is at the root of the most important political binaries in Western thought – between
private and public, subject and citizen, even though the usage of these terms
frequently changes as an eﬀect of gendered, economic and military power.
Sometimes the distinction between life and world has appeared fundamental to the
way humans have thought about and organised community and sometimes the
distinction has been ignored. Life and world have been understood as constituted
by diﬀerent activities, diﬀerent spatial locations and sometimes they have merged
into a concrete historical formation, as in the modern social realm described in
more detail momentarily.
To be clear, political action and the founding of a public political realm should
not be conflated with the human togetherness of primary sociability. It is much
more episodic and rare. Political action is not the same as cooperating with others
socially for the sake of sustaining life processes or treating others instrumentally as
means to the end of securing and accumulating wealth. Yet international theory
has not been very good at explicitly distinguishing between forms of life and
human activity, such as biological ‘life’ and ‘world’. To be sure, the field has now
belatedly joined others in the humanities and social sciences in investigating the
deep interest power has in the human body and the politics of regulating the
biological life of populations.41 As the growing literature on ‘biopolitics’ suggests,
analysis of the distinction and blurring of the distinction between our biological
37 Arendt, Human Condition, p. 46.
38 Ibid., p. 176, emphasis added.
39 Ibid., pp. 180, 179.
40 Ibid., p. 179. Recalling the significance of natality to action, the experience of disclosing one’s
who-ness is ‘like a second birth . . . This insertion is not forced upon us by necessity, like labor, and
it is not prompted by utility, like work . . .; its impulse springs from the beginning which came into
the world when we were born and to which we respond by beginning something new’. Arendt,
Human Condition, pp. 176–7.
41 For other recent applications of ‘biopolitics’ to international themes see Cristina Masters and
Elizabeth Dauphinee (eds), Logics of Biopower and the War on Terror: Living, Dying, Surviving
(London: Palgrave, 2007); Stephen Morton and Stephen Bygrave (eds), Biopolitics and the Defence
of Society: Rethinking Foucault in an Age of Terror (London: Palgrave, 2008); Michael Dillon and
Julian Reid The Liberal Way of War: Killing to Make Life Live (London: Routledge, 2009); Michael
Dillon and Andrew Neal (eds), Foucault, War, Society and Politics (London: Palgrave, 2009).
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and political lives is important, but this is only to the extent that such work does
indeed rely on the existence of such a distinction. To in any way replicate the
blurring, for example, in embracing such a thing as ‘bare life’ as an exemplary form
of political action,42 is to reinforce rather than challenge the modes of governance
that have come to dominate in the contemporary period.
Thus far it has been suggested that certain preliminary distinctions – between
primary sociability, social institutions and political action – underpin the diﬀerence
between life and world and ‘what’ and ‘who’ we are. In the next two sections, these
distinctions will be used to describe and analyse the blurring of life and world into
the modern social realm under capitalism that underpins the human security
agenda. International interventions that constitute and act on subjects based on
‘what-ness’ homogenise and depoliticise their subjects. Rather than empowering the
most marginalised, the subjectivity of those governed this way is produced in a
manner destructive of the plurality and capacity for new beginnings required for
political action. This is not an accident; it is a mode of conduct integral to the
modern social realm under capitalism. However, to make this argument in relation
to the human security agenda it is necessary to describe and analyse the historical
rise of the modern social realm from late eighteenth and nineteenth century
Europe.
The ‘social’ realm as historical formation
To think historically about the modern rise of the social is to think through the
political consequences of the transformation of primitive economy to a complex
capitalist and nation-state system. At first glance, Hannah Arendt’s peculiar
understanding of the modern social as the realm ‘where the life process has
established its own public domain’43 is idiosyncratic. Indeed, her writing in this
area has not always been well received or well understood, even by those
sympathetic to her thought. For Hanna Pitkin, whenever the concept of the social
appeared in Arendt’s work it unwittingly resembled the Blob from the 1958 movie
Attack of the Blob. Pitkin accused Arendt of reifying the social, turning it into a
horrifying monster menace ‘capable of doing and being done to’.44 On this view,
we need to demystify the Blob to properly understand the ‘real world’ problems
42 See, for example, Jenny Edkins and Véronique Pin-Fat, ‘Through the Wire: Relations of Power and
Relations of Violence’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 34 (2005), pp. 1–24. Edkins and
Pin-Fat draw on both Foucault and Giorgio Agamben to argue that we should repudiate all
distinctions or drawing of lines between ‘forms of life’. Cf. Patricia Owens, ‘Reclaiming “Bare Life”?
Against Agamben on Refugees’, International Relations, 23 (2009), pp. 567–82.
43 Arendt, Human Condition, p. 47.
44 Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, The Attack of the Blob: Hannah Arendt’s Concept of the Social (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1998), p. 226; see also Seyla Benhabib, The Reluctant Modernism of
Hannah Arendt (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1996). Arendt clearly and repeatedly
gendered her analysis of the social, for example feminising the toil and pain of labour and using
masculine imagery to describe the domination over nature associated with work. Crucially, however,
she did not posit any fundamental gender hierarchy as integral to the problems she was trying to
explicate. As Mary Dietz, has pointed out, the sex-gender binary is displaced in Arendt’s work by
the tripartite distinction between labour, work and action. Political action escapes the gender
dichotomy; politics, properly understood, is neither masculine nor feminine. Dietz, Turning
Operations: Feminism, Arendt, Politics (London: Routledge, 2002).
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Arendt was trying to address, according to Pitkin: ‘the gap between our enormous,
still increasing powers and our apparent helplessness to avert the various disasters
– national, regional, and global – looming on our horizon’.45
In fact, Arendt’s writing on the social is grounded on more than some
generalised feeling of subjection. When properly read alongside comparable
historical and theoretical work, Arendt’s concept can be defended as a powerful
analysis of the political consequences of industrial capitalism and supporting
ideologies, that is, the rise to power of the bourgeoisie and the dominance of
bourgeois categories of thought regarding economy and politics with their specific
formulation of the public-private distinction and the collapsing of the distinction
between life and world. We do not look to Arendt for a conventional history of
the social and what she does say about its historical evolution is incomplete. In
Origins of Totalitarianism, the elements that ‘crystallized’ into ‘the social’ (as well
as the totalitarian) are the political emancipation of the bourgeoisie; imperial
accumulation of capital in which ‘Expansion again appeared as a lifesaver, if and
insofar as it could provide a common interest for the nation as a whole’;46 and the
rise (and decline) of the nation-state. In The Human Condition, ‘society’s victory in
the modern age’47 is again explained by capitalism and the bureaucratic nation-
state in addition to three earlier events – imperial, religious, and scientific – at the
‘threshold’ of the ‘modern age’.48 As with her account of totalitarianism, Arendt
deliberately resisted the temptation to oﬀer a linear path of causality that might be
understood as culminating in the creation of the modern social realm. Nonetheless,
her writing in this area is united by the consistency of her unique form of
philosophical anthropology, described above, and analysis of capitalist modernity.
The specifically capitalist modernity of the ‘social’ is captured in a remark of
Justin Rosenberg’s in Empire of Civil Society. ‘Sociology’, he noted,
is commonly defined as ‘the study of society’. Yet this apparent universality bears its own
historical stamp. For ‘society’ does not present itself as an object of study . . . before the
institutional diﬀerentiation of public and private spheres, state and civil society, which
characterizes the modern West . . . In a chapter entitled ‘Political Economy and the
Discovery of Society’ [Karl Polanyi] suggests that new forms of understanding were needed
because ‘no human community had yet been conceived of which was not identical with law
and government’. The intellectual novelty of this problematic thus reflects the historical
novelty of an actual historical formation.49
45 Pitkin, Attack of the Blob, p. 6.
46 Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, new ed. with added prefaces (New York: Harcourt Brace
Jovanovich, 1966), p. 152. She goes on, quoting J. A. Hobson, ‘and it is mainly for this reason that
imperialists were allowed to become “parasites upon patriotism”’.
47 Arendt, Human Condition, p. 45; there has been one other eﬀort to extend Arendt’s writing on the
social to the international, specifically the ‘evil of neoliberal globalization’ (rather than capitalism in
general). See Hayden, Political Evil in a Global Age, pp. 92–121.
48 These events were ‘the discovery of America and the ensuing exploration of the whole earth; the
Reformation, which by expropriating ecclesiastical and monastic possessions started the two-fold
process of individual expropriation and the accumulation of social wealth; the invention of the
telescope and the development of a new science that considers the nature of the earth from the
viewpoint of the universe’. Arendt, Human Condition, p. 248. In On Revolution, there is even less
focus on the rise of the social as an historical formation, but instead an analysis of the ‘high society’
of the French court, an attack on how the ‘Social Question’ was answered during the French
Revolution. Arendt, On Revolution (New York: Viking, 1970), p. 61.
49 Justin Rosenberg, The Empire of Civil Society: a Critique of the Realist Theory of International
Relations (London: Verso, 1994), pp. 156–7; Polanyi, The Great Transformation, p. 119.
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The concept of society emerges with capitalism because newly defined ‘private’
economic activities needed to be distinguished from the state. Civil society was
capitalist economy distinguished from state ‘politics’ defined as government. John
Locke famously grounded civil society on the security of property and the capitalist
requirement that labour-power be ‘free’ and separated from the means of
production. This arrangement became liberal common-sense with ‘social contract’
theories that presented the conditions of bourgeois society as the state of nature
existing prior to political order and justifying restrictions on state control of private
property and wealth.50
The modern social realm is a distinctly capitalist form of public regulation.
With Adam Smith, the concept of civilised society shifted from a contract binding
the individual to the state toward a self-regulating domain emerging out of
individual material interests and communal needs in a market economy.51 As
David Frisby and Derek Sayer have put it, ‘the very possibility of abstractly
conceptualizing society at all would seem to have been historically dependent upon
the concrete development of bürgerliche Gesellschaft: market society, civil society,
bourgeois society. Only then did the generality society become visible, a possible
object of theory, in a way comparable to the emergence of the polis as an object
of reflection for the Greeks’.52 Human life came to be understood as something to
be rationally acted upon through a series of discrete ontological domains –
economy, politics, and now society – each with its own distinct patterns and norms.
Hegel, for example, conceived civil society as the totality of private individuals
connected together into a ‘system of needs’ that could be integrated by the rational,
universalising state that transcended the market, representing for the first time the
interests of society as a whole.53 ‘Never before’, Arendt noted, ‘had any political
organism sought to encompass all those who had actually lived in it’.54
As distinct from polis and oikos, modern market society was conceptualised as
the mass or multitude of households in which ‘social housekeeping’ was to be
provided by a bureaucratic state. Etymologically and in antiquity, oikonomia
(economy) and oikonomikos (economics) denoted the management of the house-
hold with the aim of increasing its use value to household members. As
Jean-Jacques Rousseau noted in a famous entry for ‘political economy’ in Grande
Encylopédie, ‘Economy or oeconomie, a word derived from oikos, meaning a house,
50 C. B. Macpherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: From Hobbes to Locke (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1964).
51 As Smith put it, ‘in the great chess-board of human society, every single piece has a principle of
motion of its own, altogether diﬀerent from that which the legislature might choose to impress upon
it’. Smith, The Essays of Adam Smith (London: Alex Murray and Son, 1869), p. 207.
52 David Frisby and Derek Sayer, Society (London: Tavistock, 1986), p. 120; see also Gilles Deleuze,
‘Foreword: the Rise of the Social’, in Jacques Donzelot, The Policing of Families: Welfare versus the
State (London: Hutchingson, 1979), pp. ix–xvii; Eric R. Wolf, ‘Inventing Society’, American
Ethnologist, 15 (1988), pp. 752–61; Nikolas Rose, ‘The Death of the Social? Re-figuring the Territory
of Government’, Economy and Society, 25 (1996), pp. 327–56; Peter Wagner, ‘“An Entirely New
Object of Consciousness, of Volition, of Thought”: The Coming into Being and (Almost) Passing
Away of “Society” as a Scientific Object’, in Lorraine Daston (ed.), Biographies of Scientific Objects
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000), pp. 132–57.
53 G. W. F. Hegel, Philosophy of Right (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967 [1821]); Polanyi, The
Great Transformation; for an excellent critique of Polanyi notion of ‘society as a whole’ see Sandra
Halperin, War and Social Change in Modern Europe: The Great Transformation Revisited
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
54 Arendt, ‘Karl Marx and the Tradition’, p. 288.
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and nomos, meaning law, ordinarily signifies merely the wise and legitimate
management of a house for the common good of the entire family. The meaning of
the term has since been extended to mean the management of the larger family of
the state’.55 Gunnar Myrdal similarly drew an analogy between the traditional
patriarchal model of the family household – in which the dominant paterfamilias
is in control – and the hybrid ‘political economy’ of the modern bureaucratic state
that ‘keeps house for its members’.56 For Arendt, explicitly drawing on Myrdal,
‘the collective of families economically organized into the facsimile of one
superhuman family is what we call “society”, and its political form of organization
is called “nation”’.57 Rather than the labouring classes identifying themselves as
such, modern ‘society’ identified itself with a piece of territory called the
nation-state.58 Its end purpose was to provide security for the life process of
society.
Marx, of course, powerfully exposed civil society as bürgerliche Gesellschaft, as
bourgeois society. The abstractions of both ‘the individual’ and ‘society’ were
ideological justifications for class interests.59 This problematic, the reality of class
conflict and the increasing radicalisation of workers, called forth a novel set of
‘social questions’, namely how to secure private wealth in light of the misery of the
working classes.60 The class dimension of the rise of the modern social realm and
social administration is crucial. Recall Robert Castel’s characterisation of ‘societies
with the social’, communities that have developed specialised bodies to deal with
the break down of primary sociability or the requirements of more complex
communal life. Large-scale social assistance is associated with maintaining existing
hierarchical structures, especially to the extent that it shores up ‘public order’ as
defined by dominant classes. In the pre-industrial period, the dominant formulation
of the Social Question was how to contend with the disordering eﬀects of
vagabonds, purposeless wonderers who did not work. With industrial capitalism,
not the vagabonds at the margins but the labouring masses themselves were a
threat to public order and the security of property. Rather than mass poverty and
vagabondage caused by the absence of the means of subsistence, widespread
pauperism, Castel observed, was now the result of ‘the precariousness of
employment . . . at the very heart of the wealth-creating process’.61 The issue was
no longer how to maintain social harmony in the face of vagabonds who did not
work but the insecurity of those integrated into the system of wage labour; ‘labor
as a human activity . . .’ Arendt observed, ‘became a public political fact of the first
order’.62
55 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, ‘De l’économie politique’, Grande Encylopédie, 5 (1755); available at:
{http://www.taieb.net/auteurs/Rousseau/economie.html} accessed 4 June 2011, emphasis added; see also
Foucault, Security, Territory, Population, p. 95.
56 Myrdal, Political Element, p. 140. According to Habermas, the social arose when ‘the private realm
as a whole assumed public relevance’. See Habermas, Structural Transformation, p. 127.
57 Arendt, Human Condition, p. 29.
58 Ibid., p. 256.
59 Karl Marx, Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy (London: Penguin, 1973).
60 Douglas Moggach and Paul Leduc Browne (eds), The Social Question and the Democratic Revolution:
Marx and the Legacy of 1848 (Ottawa, Ont.: University of Ottawa Press, 2000).
61 Castel, From Manual Workers to Wage Laborers, pp. 205, 197–8.
62 Arendt, ‘Karl Marx and the Tradition’, p. 284; Castel, From Manual Workers to Wage Laborers,
p. 146.
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Social welfare emerged as a compromise between the cruelty of the profit
motive under capitalism and the strategic requirements of minimal solidarity. In
mitigating the worst eﬀects of capitalism, existing property relations could be
secured through a combination of ‘social’ and moral regulation. For political
realists, accepting the reality of class antagonism but rejecting socialist hopes for
its resolution, the creation of and intervention into the social realm served an
important function for state power.63 Observing first German Chancellor Otto von
Bismarck’s formation of comprehensive social insurance during the 1880s, the first
system of its kind, Max Weber realised that a strong Sozialstaat was necessary in
the context of the power struggle between nations; state run social policy would tie
the fate of the German working classes to the success of the imperial nation.64
Successful realpolitik required strong socialpolitik. Impressed by the ‘social impe-
rialism’ of nineteenth century England, in which class resentment was partially
displaced by the cultivation of working class pride in the Empire, Carl Schmitt
believed that in ‘protect[ing] one and disarm[ing] the other’ social policy neutralised
the friend-enemy opposition of class antagonism.65 In France, Émile Durkheim’s
conception of solidarity emerged as a third way beyond liberal individualism and
Marxist class conflict. For Durkheim, social cohesion was based on the degree of
dependence the component parts of society have on each other. Society itself and
the social ties between people were conceived as objects of intervention with the
state and its laws the ‘public’ entity responsible for maintaining the bonds of
solidarity.66
The mechanics of such modern ‘social’ arrangements are not captured in
Hobbes’ sovereign model of power and its associated conception of security.
‘Security remained the decisive criterion’, Arendt noted, ‘but not the individual’s
security against “violent death”, as in Hobbes . . . but a security which should
permit an undisturbed development of the life process of society as a whole’.67 The
term ‘government’, from ‘govern’, the Greek word kubernan, ‘to steer’, indicates
the purpose of civil administration, the steering of large-scale human conduct and
the remodelling of ‘society’. Successful nation-states are imagined to secure a way
of life in which the pursuit of ‘private’ interests is made compatible with the
63 For analysis of the political realist paradigm of social regulation in ‘population-centric’ counterin-
surgency see Owens, ‘From Bismarck to Petraeus: The Question of the Social and the Social
Question in Counterinsurgency’, European Journal of International Relations (forthcoming).
64 Wolfgang J. Mommsen, Max Weber and German Politics, 1890–1920 (Chicago: Chicago University
Press, 1984); see also Steinmetz, Regulating the Social; van Meerhaeghe, ‘Bismarck and the Social
Question’.
65 Carl Schmitt, The Nomos of the Earth: in the International Law of the Jus Publicum Europaeum (New
York: Telos, 2006 [1950]), p. 332, fn. 17. On ‘social imperialism’ see Hans Ulrich Wehler, The
German Empire, 1871–1918 (Oxford: Berg Publishers, 1997).
66 Émile Durkheim, The Division of Labour in Society, intro. Lewis A. Coser (NY: New York: Free
Press, 1997); the apparent opposition between a political realist and even Schmittian logic in the
provision of social security and the more liberal and solidarist emphasis implicitly animate the debate
over human security. As Pauline Ewan has noted, according to many, ‘rather than the human
security agenda’s initial “solidarist” concern for poor people in the global North and South, the
securitization of poverty, displacement and disease fosters a [Schmittian] logic of enmity that
constitutes Southern populations as threats to’ wealthy states in the global North. See Ewan,
‘Deepening the Human Security Debate: Beyond the Politics of Conceptual Clarification’, Politics,
27 (2007), p. 186.
67 Arendt, Between Past and Future: Eight Exercises in Political Thought (New York: Viking, 1968),
p. 150. For a more recent rendition of this argument see Mark Neocleous, Critique of Security
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2008).
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so-called ‘public’ good. However, the social realm is neither properly public nor
private. Matters related to building the common public political world, as
described above, are conflated with those related to maintaining life; the so-called
public (government) became a function of private, class interests.68 In such a
system, Arendt insisted, any so-called common good (as in Rousseau) or
common-wealth (as in Hobbes) ought to be distinguished from notions of the
worldliness of the public realm; concepts of common good or common-wealth
signal ‘only that’ newly defined ‘private individuals have interests in common’, that
is, the security of life and property.69
The public was redefined and made synonymous with government and
government’s primary rationale was the sustenance of ‘society’. In Arendt’s
terminology, ‘the criterion for action within’ this new realm of the social ‘is
competence and eﬃciency in securing life’s necessities’.70 This is the context for
Foucault’s increasingly influential claims regarding the workings of ‘power over
man insofar as man is a living being’.71 Biopower, he argued, regulated populations
through pastoral care, producing whole populations – societies – amenable to
coordination and mobilisation in the face of new threats and material vulnerabili-
ties. Novel forms of statistical and demographic knowledge justified and sustained
systems of intervention into more and more areas of life; it determined whether
some groups needed more direct management than others, more targeted inter-
ventions in populations subdivided socially, that is, along lines of nationality, class,
gender, sexuality, and race. While modern life was made healthier, longer lasting,
rational, productive and eﬃcient, man-as-species became an object of administra-
tive control, intervention and normalisation.
It has not been diﬃcult for international theorists of biopolitics to present
human security as the latest eﬀort to constitute subjects, this time in the global
South, ‘that contribute to global stability through their good health, employability,
competitiveness, productivity and political docility’.72 This section has suggested
that biopolitical forms of control, as well as political realist subordination of class
conflict to state power, are two elements of something broader, the rise of the social
realm under capitalism. Moreover, as the next section will illustrate, the distinction
between the historical rise of the social and the worldliness of public, political
action, thus far absent in international theories of biopolitics, oﬀers a distinctive
and broader position from which to query human security and suggests what is at
stake in the emergence of the transnational management of human needs under
worldwide capitalist relations: ‘the linkage of politics and life results in an inner
contradiction that cancels and destroys what is specifically political about politics’.73
68 Arendt, Human Condition, pp. 35, 69.
69 Ibid., p. 35.
70 Ibid., p. 135.
71 Foucault, Society Must be Defended, pp. 239–40; see also Foucault, History of Sexuality: an
Introduction, Volume 1, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Vintage, 1978), p. 139; On the overlaps
between Arendt’s writing on the social and Foucault’s account of biopolitics see Kathrin Braun,
‘Biopolitics and Temporality in Arendt and Foucault’, Time and Society, 16 (2007), pp. 5–23; André
Duarte, ‘Hannah Arendt, Biopolitics, and the Problem of Violence: From animal laborans to homo
sacer’, in Richard H. King and Dan Stone (eds), Hannah Arendt and the Uses of History:
Imperialism, Nation, Race, and Genocide (Oxford: Berghahn, 2007), pp. 191–204.
72 Grayson, ‘Human Security as Power/Knowledge’, p. 395.
73 Arendt, The Promise of Politics, p. 145.
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Human security as the social
The discourse of human security emerged, in part, out of dissatisfaction with
orthodox conceptions of security and development, the former largely concerned
with the power of the state against external risks and threats and the latter
synonymous with economic growth in a global capitalist economy. When juxta-
posed to state or geopolitical security, human security appeared to be revisionist
almost by definition; the intention was to undermine many of the power structures
that create humanitarian catastrophe. Much about the eﬀort to move beyond
orthodox conceptions of security and development is well meaning and the agenda
here is not the reactionary one of merely criticising those seeking to assist those
living in abject fear and want. Indeed, to extend a point made about social work
in general, it is worth noting that human security ‘has a relationship of continuous
tension arising from the conflicting roles of maintaining the consensus (and acting
as an agent of social control) and on occasions of being involved in conflict and
confrontation situations against authority’.74 Perhaps in the face of capitalism’s
relentless exploitation of both the natural earth and the public, political world the
reformist social work of the human security agenda is the best that can be
achieved.
To think about the modern social today means thinking in a context of the
dismantling of welfare states, but also of the greater regulation of under-
development and violent conflict by global and regional institutions.75 Given the
long history of colonial administration and its heyday in the nineteenth century,
forms of social regulation have always been implicated in imperial hierarchy.76
However, the ‘social policies’ that provide content to human security interventions
take place in a transnational economic and military context in which a greater
variety of institutions are involved in its design and implementation. Social forms
of governance have become transnational in scope; the relationship between ‘social
policy’ and the state is breaking down. The idea of the ‘national economy’ that was
central to the rise of the social realm in the nineteenth century has given way to
an awareness of the greater intensity and consequences of worldwide economic
connections. Although governing elites still largely organise public administration
based (with some exceptions) on a national and territorial logic ‘they no longer
conceive of themselves as operating upon a naturally functioning and systemati-
cally integrated national population whose “social” coherence is a condition for its
economic security’.77 National and transnational private entities are assuming
responsibilities previously viewed as ‘public’. Governance has flowed upwards to
supranational entities and downwards to local and regional governments. ‘The
social’ is mutating.
For Robert Castel, recall, the primary purpose of all organised social assistance
is to maintain or create the greatest possible social harmony, to uphold order and
74 Colin Pritchard and Richard K. S. Taylor, Social Work: Reform or Revolution (London: Routledge,
1978), p. 1.
75 Christopher Pierson, Beyond the Welfare State? The New Political Economy of Welfare (Cambridge:
Polity, 2006).
76 See, for example, Gayan Prakash, ‘The Colonial Genealogy of Society: Community and Political
Modernity in India’, in Patrick Joyce (ed.), The Social in Question: New Bearings in History and the
Social Sciences (London: Routledge, 2002), pp. 81–96.
77 Rose, ‘the Death of the Social?’, p. 330.
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equilibrium. In our context, threats to security and development are no longer seen
as unrelated or aﬀecting only the most problematic parts of the earth. Dominant
states and their international organisations have sought to intervene and transform
other collectivities into societies with a functioning social realm; it is the most
eﬀective means of ensuring their ability to govern themselves. From the perspective
developed earlier, the ‘social’ agenda of human security is the continuation of the
process of capitalist security management in which the catastrophes created and
sustained by imperial hierarchy are contained in the global South. As a result, an
uneven global social realm has been conceived as a totality, ‘the facsimile of one
superhuman family’,78 to borrow Arendt’s words, that can be acted upon in the
name of social progress. More specifically, human security regulates the life process
of parts of the human species by watching over and intervening in the general
health and wellbeing of certain populations in need, what the UN refers to as the
‘vital core of all human lives’.
There can be little doubt that the protection and sustenance of life processes
has become the central function of national and now increasingly global forms of
social governance. The institutional growth and acceleration of the human security
agenda is partly driven by a logic Arendt identified as crucial to the social realm,
its ‘irresistible tendency to grow’.79 It is a cliché that bureaucracy, ‘the most social
form of government’,80 expands to meet the needs of an expanding bureaucracy.
This bureaucracy is constantly produced and reproduced because, recalling
Arendt’s phenomenology of diﬀerent human activities, ‘the life process itself . . . has
been channelled into the public realm’.81 The multiple and complex threats to
human life from unequal access to heath services, food and water, climate change,
and economic and military crises demand urgent action into the most basic
conditions of human existence. These conditions are ‘born of a great urgency’,
Arendt commented, ‘and motivated by a more powerful drive than anything else,
because life itself depends on it’.82 This life sustaining labour is cyclical and
repetitive and yet at some point the task of the bureaucratic administrator of social
assistance ‘is less to keep the life process intact and provide for its regeneration’,
Arendt warned, ‘than to care for the upkeep of the various gigantic bureaucratic
machines whose processes consume their services and devour their products as
quickly and mercilessly as the biological life process itself’.83 If the human security
agenda can be understood as an expansion of ‘the organizational device of the
household’,84 then it is not the despotic patriarch, but the bureaucrat, who rules.
The diversity of administrative forms and variety of non-state actors carrying
out the human security agenda should be no surprise in light of the particular
ontology of the social realm as a hybrid of public and private. None of the formal
characteristics identified in Castel’s study of social institutions require assistance to
be provided by unambiguously ‘public’ or ‘private’ actors.85 Social institutions,
78 Arendt, Human Condition, p. 29.
79 Ibid., p. 87.
80 Ibid., p. 40.
81 Ibid., p. 45.
82 Ibid., p. 87.
83 Ibid., p. 93.
84 Ibid., p. 40.
85 As Gilles Deleuze also observed, the social ‘leads to a new hybrid form of the public and the private,
and itself produces a repartition, a novel interlacing of interventions and withdrawals of the state’.
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recall, are those specialised and often professionalised constructions aimed at
protecting and integrating members of a perceived collective; increasingly routi-
nised decision-making processes determine who receives assistance; and these
practices are ‘implicated in the creation of new forms of space’.86 The panoply of
actors involved in the identification, provision, and implementation of human
security, the creation of ‘humanitarian’ space, similarly constitutes a system of
governance and all that this implies in terms of ‘steering’ human societies. Keeping
in mind the distinction between diﬀerent public forms, these humanitarian spaces
should be understood as social, rather than political, as concerned with life rather
than world.
In a manner comparable to the surveillance and governance of welfare
recipients in the core capitalist states, human security workers are tasked with
managing populations conceived as dangerous to others and themselves. The
pressing task is to create operational procedures for implementing the new security
agenda, the accumulated standards of knowledge and ideas about progress, on
particular populations. In the administration of human security, populations are
divided and segmented into ethnic, gendered, age, national, and regional categories.
This system of distinguishing one group from another, Arendt argued, is a
‘constituent element of the social realm’.87 This is social discrimination based on
human categories and types, and is necessary when operating on such a large-scale.
The problem, Arendt continued, ‘is that in society everybody must answer the
question of what he is – as distinct from . . . who he is’.88 Recall the discussion of
‘what-ness’ and ‘who-ness’, the diﬀerent social and political subjectivities. Because
human security intervenes into diﬀerent specimens of the human species, it
constitutes subjects in the manner of social behaviour rather than political action.
Behaviour is routine conduct, regulated and normalised, the following of norms,
conventions, and standards created by expert others. The mentalities and modes of
conduct required for political action, in contrast, not only reveals a unique
‘who-ness’, they require the presence of a plurality of others who are equal, but not
the same (equality is to the political what sameness is to the social). This plurality
underpins the human ability to do more than multiply and sustain the species for
the sake of life; it is creative of a public political world, an artefact in-between
people where it is possible to interrupt and disrupt the repetitiveness of labouring
processes and the instrumentality of work.
With the modern rise and transnational expansion of the social – in which
management of the life process of dangerous populations is the central function of
governance – the distinction between life and world has collapsed. Seen in this
light, the defining feature of modernity was not self-alienation, as Marx had it, but
world alienation.89 Worldly political existence is diﬀerent from the simple fact of
living. To live and labour on the earth is not the same as inhabiting a world of
Deleuze, ‘Foreword’, p. x. Similarly, for Foucault, liberalism exists ‘not from the existence of the
state . . . but rather from society, which is in a complex relation of exteriority and interiority with
respect to the state’. Foucault, Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth, ed. Paul Rabinow (New York: New
Press, 1997), p. 75.
86 Castel, From Manual Workers to Wage Laborers, pp. 16–17.
87 Arendt, Men in Dark Times (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1968), p. 155.
88 Ibid.
89 Arendt, Human Condition, p. 254; Jennifer Ring ‘On Needing Both Marx and Arendt: Alienation
and the Flight from Inwardness’, Political Theory, 17 (1989), pp. 432–48.
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stable institutions and experiences that make political life possible. In the 1950s,
Arendt predicted that a new stage of world alienation would emerge from the
processes now commonly associated with so-called ‘globalisation’ and the human
security agenda: the ‘decline of the European nation-state system; the economic
and geographic shrinkage of the earth . . .; the transformation of mankind, which
until our own time was an abstract notion or a guiding principle for humanists
only, into a really existing entity’.90 These conditions mark our current stage of
world alienation, an era in which global governance, global steering, is a reality –
the transnational, uneven, bureaucratic administration of the global life process.
‘Just as the family and its property were replaced by class membership and national
territory’, Arendt observed, ‘so mankind now begins to replace nationally bound
societies, and the earth replaces the limited state territory’.91 Arendt was
anticipating the extent to which forms of ‘social’ control would operate through
humans as animal laborans, how the necessary metabolism with nature of millions
could become the concern of an entire architecture of global governance.
Conclusion
Human security discourse has been contentious and there are a variety of criticisms
of its eﬀort to broaden and deepen the security field. While many of those involved
in the theory and practice of human security are well meaning, this form of
intervention upholds rather than fundamentally challenges existing hierarchical
structures. The new architecture of global governance build around the concept is
intended to prevent disruption to the circulation of global capital and the infliction
of mass casualties on the consumer societies of ‘the West’.92 Yet the security/
insecurity cycle continues like the repetitive cycle of the life process itself. This is
because much in the human security agenda is a scaling up of a much older
phenomenon, the management of the life process of society implicit in the
understanding of security required by the modern capitalist state.93 At the level of
philosophical and historical foundation, the human security agenda cannot be
radically distinguished from this earlier incarnation. Modern security discourses
provide the justification for the expansion of the life of ‘society’ under capitalism.
The human security agenda has become assimilated to ‘the life process of society
which’, Arendt wrote, ‘like all biological processes insatiably draws everything
available into the cycle of its metabolism’.94
Some elements of this assimilation process are found in political realism. The
historical relationship between realpolitik and socialpolitik, identified by Weber,
illuminates how ‘social’ problems need to be subordinated to the requirements of
state power and why ‘under-development’ can become a strategic concern.
However, to the extent that political realism merely uses the social for strategic
90 Arendt, Human Condition, p. 257.
91 Ibid.
92 Duﬃeld, Development, Security and Unending War.
93 For a fuller discussion see Owens, ‘The Supreme Social Concept: The Un-worldliness of Modern
Security’, New Formations, 71 (2011), pp. 14–29.
94 Arendt, Between Past and Future, p. 207.
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ends, it debases the very possibility of meaningful politics; it is simply a legitimated
form of domination. This is a description of government under capitalism rather
than a theory of politics. Any refusal to tell the story of human security in terms
of a simplistic realist dichotomy between securing states (the supposedly old
agenda) and securing individuals (the supposedly new one) is to some degree
praiseworthy. The concept of biopolitics is useful to the extent that it refuses this
dichotomy and also highlights the blurring of the distinction between ‘bio’ and
‘politics’ – or better ‘life’ and ‘world’ – characteristic of much modern life.
However, an account of the rise of the social and the distinction between life and
world more specifically suggests what it is about ‘life itself’ that makes it
acquiescent to manipulation and why politics-as-life is fake politics. As Arendt put
it, ‘human beings in the true sense of the term can exist only where there is a
world, and there can be a world in the true sense of the term only where the
plurality of the human race is more than a simple multiplication of a single
species’.95 The concept of the social and its life processes does not tell us everything
that we need to know about recent changes in the architecture of global
governance. But it does suggest that there are real dangers in placing the servicing
of life at the centre of politics. Human security is about building collective
responsibility, a will to intervene, to protect those in danger. The problem is that
‘the larger the population . . . the more likely it will be the social rather than the
political that constitutes the public realm’.96
95 Arendt, Promise of Politics, p. 176.
96 Arendt, Human Condition, p. 43.
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